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he  revelation  of  the  top-secret  US 
intelligence-led  PRISM  programme  has 
triggered  wide-ranging  debates  across 
Europe.  Press  reports  featured  in  the  Guardian 
and Washington Post have shed new light on the 
electronic  surveillance  ‘fishing  expeditions’ 
(dragnet)  of  the  US  National  Security  Agency 
(NSA)  and  the  FBI  into  the  world’s  largest 
electronic  communications  companies.  Sensitive 
data  of  citizens  and  residents  of  the  European 
Union  appear  to  have  been  monitored  by  US 
intelligence services since 2007. The purposes of 
this  monitoring  include  the  so-called  ‘fight 
against terrorism’, but also, news reports allege, 
electronic  espionage  for  political  reasons, 
including  the  monitoring  of  civil  society 
organisations in foreign countries.1  
This Policy Brief addresses the main controversies 
raised by the PRISM affair and the most relevant 
policy challenges that it poses for the EU. A set of 
concrete  policy  recommendations  is  also 
addressed to the EU for implementing a robust 
data protection strategy in response to the affair. 
Our argument is two-fold:  
                                                   
1 See title 50 of the US Code, Chapter 36, subchapter 1 
‘Electronic  Surveillance’, section  1801.  Refer  also  to  the 
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  (FISA) 
Amendments  Act  of  2008,  dealing  with  ‘Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance’, in particular section 702 which 
deals  with  procedures  for  targeting  certain  persons 
outside the US other than US persons. 
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First, the leaks over the PRISM programme have 
profoundly undermined the trust and confidence 
that EU citizens have in their governments and 
the  European  institutions  to  safeguard  and 
protect the most fundamental freedoms related to 
their private and family lives. It has also shown 
the  limits  and  loopholes  of  current  EU  data 
protection  legislation  with  respect  to  data 
processing with third countries and cooperation 
among  law  enforcement/IT  service  providers 
both inside and outside Europe.  
Second,  the  PRISM  affair  raises  questions 
regarding the capacity of EU institutions to draw 
lessons from the past. This is hardly the first time 
that issues related to blanket retention and mass 
surveillance have surfaced in the European public 
debate. Although different in scope and outlook, 
tensions over PRISM are strongly reminiscent of 
the  ECHELON  and  Carnivore  controversies  of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. More recently, the 
Passenger  Name  Record  (PNR)  and  Terrorist 
Finance  Tracking  Programme  (TFTP) 
demonstrated the acute sensitivity of discussions 
on  the  EU’s  capacity  to  protect  the  data  of  its 
citizens  and  residents  in  the  context  of 
transatlantic  relations.  And  last  year,  some  co-
authors  of  this  Policy  Brief  also  insisted  on  the 
dangers to the privacy of European citizens posed 
by the concurrence between the growing reliance 
on and embrace of cloud computing technologies 
as  a  central  policy  option  for  the  EU’s  ‘digital 
agenda’  and  legislation  passed  in  the  US 
concerning  the  data  of  non-US  citizens, 
particularly under Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign 
Intelligence  Surveillance  Amendment  Act 
(FISAA).2 
1.  What is PRISM about? 
On  6  June  2013,  the  Guardian  and  Washington 
Post newspapers published articles revealing that 
an  electronic  surveillance  system  called  PRISM 
had  been  used  by  intelligence  services  in  the 
United  States  since  2007.3  The  top-secret 
                                                   
2 D. Bigo, G. Boulet, C. Bowden, S. Carrera, J. Jeandesboz 
and  A.  Scherrer  (2012),  “Fighting  Cybercrime  and 
Protecting Privacy in the Cloud”, study commissioned by 
the  European  Parliament,  Brussels 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studie
sdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=79050).  
3  See  articles  in  the  Guardian  (www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data)  and  the 
document  leaked  to  journalists  was  reportedly 
used  to  train  intelligence  operatives  on  the 
functions  and  scope  of  the  PRISM  programme. 
The  programme  was  introduced  during  the 
George  W.  Bush  administration,  following  the 
disclosure of the NSA’s ‘warrantless wiretapping’ 
activities  by  the  New York  Times  in  2005.4  The 
NSA had installed a computer on the premises of 
the  AT&T  switching  centre  in  San  Francisco, 
allowing the agency to plug and tap directly into 
the fiber optic cables through which Internet data 
traffic enters and leaves the United States.  
The  warrantless  wiretapping  programme  was 
shut down in 2007 and ‘legalised’ the same year 
by  the  Protect  America  Act.  The  Act  provided 
retroactive  immunity  to  the  telecommunications 
companies involved and allowed wiretapping to 
continue  without  individual  warrants, 
conditional  upon  the  approval  of  NSA 
procedures  by  the  secret  Foreign  Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC). A subsequent test case 
at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review (tasked with reviewing FISC decisions to 
deny  applications  for  electronic  surveillance 
warrants) confirmed that the Fourth Amendment 
of  the  US  Constitution,5  which  requires  any 
warrant  for  surveillance  operations  to  be 
judicially sanctioned and supported by probable 
cause, only applied to surveillance directed at US 
persons.6 The decision opened the way for the US 
Congress to enact FISAA §1881a authorising the 
mass  surveillance  of  non-US  foreigners  outside 
                                                                                      
Washington  Post  (www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/ 
06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html). 
4  This  and  the  following  points  draw  from  C.  Bowden 
(2013),  “How  to  wiretap  the  Cloud  without  almost 
anyone  noticing:  FISAA,  Data  Protection  and  PRISM”, 
speech  delivered  at  3rd  Annual  ORGcon,  Open  Rights 
Group,  London,  8  June 
(https://orgcon.openrightsgroup.org/2013/videos).  See 
also  S.  Braun,  A.  Flaherty,  J.  Gillum  and  M.  Apuzzo 
(2013),  “Secret  to  PRISM  Program:  Even  Bigger  Data 
Seizure’,  Associated  Press,  15  June 
(http://tinyurl.com/lb5b4wc). 
5  The  Fourth  Amendment  to  the  United  States 
Constitution is the part of the Bill of Rights that guards 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
6  Bigo  et  al.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  33-34. 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studie
sdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=79050).  OPEN SEASON FOR DATA FISHING ON THE WEB | 3 
 
US territory but whose data are in the range of US 
jurisdiction. 
The programme allows the NSA to have access to 
communications and stored data in the servers of 
nine IT companies (designated as ‘special source 
operations’): Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, 
Skype,  Apple,  Paltalk,  Youtube  and  AOL.  The 
collected data on ‘targeted foreign users’ include, 
among  others,  email,  chat,  videos,  photos,  file 
transfers,  social  networking  data  and  ‘other 
special  requests’.  No  further  details  have  been 
reported regarding the exact nature and scope of 
this data. Media sources state that the NSA does 
not appear to have direct (so-called ‘root’) access 
to user data, and suggest the handling of requests 
differs  from  company  to  company.  Possibilities 
for  handling  Section  702  requests  vary  from 
dealing manually with each query to installing an 
onsite  box  enabling  NSA  access  to  traffic,  to 
uploading  information  through  an  NSA  web 
terminal.7  These  uncertainties  notwithstanding, 
one point is quite clear: PRISM has been enabled 
by reliance on cloud computing. In this sense, the 
PRISM  affair  is  less  about  telecommunication 
interception, which was the main issue with the 
ECHELON  affair  for  instance,  than  about 
accessing  data  thought  to  be  processed  ‘in  the 
cloud’,  but  de  facto  circulating  through the  data 
centres of U.S. based companies. 
We  should  learn  more  about  the  exact 
functioning of PRISM over the next few weeks, 
provided  also  that  the  findings  of  the 
Transatlantic  Group  of  Experts,  whose  creation 
was announced on 14 June 2013 by Commissioner 
for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, build on a 
thorough assessment and are made fully public.8 
Discussion over the specifics of the programme’s 
functioning, however, should not obfuscate the 
central issue that has stirred so much controversy 
following  the  disclosure  of  the  PRISM  affair: 
namely that non-US citizens using the services 
of  companies  falling  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
the US government have consistently been the 
                                                   
7  See  e.g.  A.  Soltani  (2013),  “PRISM:  Solving  for  X”,  14 
June (http://tinyurl.com/m5sau2v).  
8  C.  Malmström  (2013),  “EU  and  US  will  set  a 
transatlantic  group  of  experts  to  discuss  the  U.S. 
programmes more in details”, Dublin, EU-US Justice and 
Home  Affairs  Ministerial  Conference,  Dublin,  14  June, 
SPEECH/13/537. 
target of mass data collection for the purpose of 
foreign intelligence surveillance.  
Controversies over the exact scope of PRISM and 
its  implications  demonstrate  that  the  current 
situation  is  one  of  high  legal  uncertainty  that 
poses  a  critical  challenge  to  the  fundamental 
rights of EU citizens. The PRISM affair conjured 
a  significant  amount  of  indignation  in  the  U.S. 
over the fact that its functioning could violate the 
safeguards afforded to US citizens under the 4th 
Amendment, and the so-called ‘51% test’.9 Under 
FISAA section 702, however, non-US citizens are 
excluded from the scope of the 4th Amendment. 
Existing European instruments such as the data 
protection  Directive,  the  Council  of  Europe’s 
Convention 108 on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data or the Convention on Cybercrime, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, do not 
apply. The PRISM affair further casts doubt over 
the  sincerity  and  effectiveness  of  existing  data 
protection  and  privacy  measures  regulating 
transatlantic  flows  of  data,  particularly  the  Safe 
Harbor principle. Finally, should news reports be 
confirmed that the United Kingdom’s GCHQ (the 
British  equivalent  of  the  NSA)  has  been  using 
data  collected  through  PRISM  for  similar 
purposes, it is clear that this is not a problem that 
the  US  authorities  alone  can  be  easily  and 
conveniently blamed for. 
2.  What are the main controversies 
around PRISM? Sovereignty, 
ownership and data protection  
The first outstanding issue in the PRISM affair is 
the loss of sovereignty over the information held 
by the IT companies. The PRISM programme has 
reportedly allowed US intelligence authorities to 
spy  on  and  have  access  to  data  stored  about 
citizens  and  residents  in  the  EU  without  the 
knowledge and express consent of its European 
counterparts,  including  the  EU  institutions  and 
agencies,  as  well  as  member  states’  national 
governments. By doing so, American authorities 
have  directly  circumvented  the  ‘rules  of  the 
game’  in  international  relations,  which  require 
faithful cooperation by partner sovereign powers. 
A foreign state seems to have unlimited access to 
                                                   
9  According  to  which  data  collection  measures  should 
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the lives of millions of EU citizens and persons 
legally residing in the Union’s territory.  
Mistrust  transpires  from  the  first  reactions  in 
the  EU  after  the  revelation  of  the  affair.  The 
German  Justice  Minister  Sabine  Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger  called  the  programme 
“alarming” and pointed out that the “fight against 
enemies  of  the  state  does  not  legitimate  any  means 
available”.10  These  reactions  constitute  only  one 
example  of  the sovereignty  dilemmas  raised  by 
PRISM. Similar concerns have been raised by the 
Vice-President of the European Commission and 
Commissioner  for  Justice,  Fundamental  Rights 
and Citizenship, Viviane Reding. In a letter sent 
to  the  US  Attorney  General  on  10  June  2013, 
Reding  asked  for  clarification  on  the  PRISM 
programme  and  underlined  that  “trust  that  the 
rule  of  law  will  be  respected  is  also  essential  to  the 
stability and growth of the digital economy, including 
transatlantic business”.11 She also emphasised that 
programmes like PRISM can undermine the trust 
of citizens and companies and formal channels of 
legal  assistance  cooperation  should  be  instead 
used,  except  in  “clearly  defined,  exceptional  and 
judicially reviewed situations”. 
PRISM has shown a clear ‘loss of control’ in the 
EU and its member states over the sovereignty 
of this data and revealed a great deal of mistrust 
on the part of European institutions and member 
states’  national  governments  towards  the  US. 
This is particularly worrying in a policy domain 
(‘the fight against terrorism’) that has been highly 
political and controversial during the last 15 years 
of  cooperation  with  Europe  because  of  the 
challenges  posed  by  the  US  policy  to  well-
established European data protection and privacy 
standards  and  legislation.  The  EU  institutions 
and the US had already experienced substantial 
tension over the US acquisition, retention and 
use of data about EU citizens before PRISM.  
The first case involved Passenger Name Records 
(PNR) where, using the same modus operandi, the 
US  authorities  obliged  private-sector  actors,  in 
this case airlines, to allow wide access to personal 
data of people flying to the US. In the end, after 
                                                   
10  See  http://www.dw.de/pressure-on-merkel-to-talk-
prism-with-obama/a-16876477  
11  Viviane  Reding,  Vice-President  of  the  European 
Commission,  Brussels,  10  June  2013,  Ref. 
Ares(2013)1935546 - 10/06/2013. 
substantial  negotiations,  the  EU  institutions 
(including  the  European  Parliament)  ceded  to 
most  of  the  demands  of  the  US  and  signed  an 
agreement  making  the  data  collection  and  use 
lawful.12  The  second  occasion  was  the 
SWIFT/TFTP  affair,  where  the  US  authorities 
required another private-sector actor, SWIFT, to 
allow  them  wide  access  to  information  on 
electronic  transactions  of  individuals  and 
businesses  around  the  world  managed  by  the 
company  for  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions.  Once  again,  after  negotiations  and 
substantial pressure from the US authorities, all 
the EU institutions ceded to the majority of the 
US demands and settled an agreement legalising 
the information practices. The question might be 
raised  as  to  whether  the  EU  institutions  will 
simply  enter  into  an  agreement  making  such 
personal data collection, storage and use lawful 
or whether they will take a more robust approach 
this time? 
The  second  outstanding  issue  is  related  to  the 
ownership of the data and the protection of EU 
citizens’ and residents’ privacy. Who owns the 
information and personal data stored by these IT 
companies?  The  existing  European  legal 
standards  on  data  protection  provide  a  fairly 
clear answer to this question. The EU Charter of 
Fundamental  Rights  and  the  European 
Convention of Human Rights expressly recognise 
the  individual  as  the  first  owner  of  her/his 
personal data. Consent is therefore deemed to be 
a fundamental component in EU law with respect 
to  lawful  uses  and  processing  of  personal 
information,  including  law  enforcement 
purposes. A majority of Europeans surveyed in a 
Special  Eurobarometer  Report  on  “Attitudes  on 
Data  Protection  and  Electronic  Identity”13  were 
concerned about the recording of their behaviour 
via payment cards (54% vs. 38%), mobile phones 
(49% vs. 43%) or mobile Internet (40% vs. 35%). 
70% of them were concerned that their personal 
data  held  by  companies  could  be  used  for 
                                                   
12 E. Brouwer (2011), “Ignoring Dissent and Legality: The 
EU’s  Proposal  to  Share  the  Personal  Information  of  all 
Passengers”,  CEPS  Paper  in  Liberty  and  Security  in 
Europe, CEPS, Brussels. 
13  Eurobarometer  (2011),  “Attitudes  on  Data  Protection 
and Electronic Identity in the European Union”, Special 
Eurobarometer  Report  No  359,  June 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_
359_en.pdf). OPEN SEASON FOR DATA FISHING ON THE WEB | 5 
 
purposes  different  from  those  for  which  it  was 
collected.  Moreover,  more  than  six  respondents 
out  of  ten  (63%)  declared  that  the  disclosure  of 
personal  information  constitutes  a  big  issue  for 
them.  PRISM  defies  data  protection  and  takes 
away the ownership of that data from the hands 
of  European  citizens  and  residents  as  data 
subjects  towards  distant  territories  and  foreign 
authorities. A particular issue of concern however 
is the challenges inherent in data protection in the 
scope of social networks such as Facebook. How 
to  ensure  a  meaningful  ownership  of  people’s 
personal  data  in  the  cloud,  especially  in  what 
concerns social networks? 
PRISM  challenges  the  status  of  citizenship  of 
the  Union.  As  President  Obama  has  indeed 
stated in his response to the leaking of the NSA 
secret document, the PRISM programme “does not 
apply to US citizens and it does not apply to people in 
the United States”.14 Only non-US persons outside 
the  US  are  targeted  by  the  programme.  This 
tracking  of  ‘suspected  foreign  terrorists’  has,  in 
Obama’s view, respected a ‘fair balance’ between 
security and freedom. EU citizens and residents 
have  been  therefore  amongst  those  targeted  by 
these  fishing  expeditions  and  subject  to  a 
generalised  suspicion  which  stands  in  tension 
with  the  presumption  of  innocence.  One  of  the 
main differences between in the US and the EU is 
that the  US  legal  system  does  not  protect  'non-
American  citizens  or  residents'  (including  EU 
citizens) as data subjects. In contrast, in the EU 
data  protection  legal  regime,  any  third-country 
national  (including  US  citizens)  should  have 
access  to  data  protection  rights  and  effective 
remedies  in  cases  of  alleged  violations  by  the 
authorities. In  this  way,  the PRISM programme 
sends  a  clear  message  that  all  EU  citizens  and 
residents  are  at  the  mercy  of  US  intelligence 
services. EU member states and institutions have 
therefore  failed  in  protecting  their  citizens  and 
residents against unlawful interference and mass 
surveillance  by  foreign  authorities.  Programmes 
like  PRISM  make  the  rights  of  citizens  and 
residents  in  Europe  ever  more  insecure  and 
unsafe. 
                                                   
14 See the complete statement at www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2013/06/07/statement-president 
3.  What are the policy challenges for 
the EU? Loopholes and shortcomings 
A first policy challenge arises from the legal gaps 
revealed by the affair. The existing EU legislative 
framework  does  not  cover  transatlantic 
cooperation on data protection in the domain of 
police and criminal justice cooperation, or in what 
concerns  European  governments’  collaboration 
with IT companies in these same law enforcement 
areas.  This  leads  to  a  situation  of  severe  legal 
uncertainty.  There  is  currently  no  general 
legislative  framework  for  the  protection  of 
personal  data  across  the  Atlantic  in  the  area  of 
police  and  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal 
matters.  The  Agreement  on  mutual  legal 
assistance between the EU and the US,15 signed in 
2003,  includes  in  its  scope  the  sharing  of 
information already held by public authorities in 
both  parties.  The  current  data  protection 
Directive (95/46/EC) governs the storage of data 
by private companies, but not the subsequent use 
and access for law enforcement purposes.16 The 
PRISM affair is thus unfolding in a legal grey 
area  that  current  and  forthcoming  legislation 
does not seem equipped to address.  
The so-called data protection reform legislative 
package presented by the European Commission 
in 2012 is indeed composed of the general data 
protection  Regulation  (COM(2012)11)  and  the 
Directive  (COM(2012)10)  dealing  with  data 
protection  in  the  fields  of  police  and  judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.17 The package is 
now  in  the  hands  of  the  European  Parliament, 
which is acting as co-legislator in both legislative 
files.  In  general,  the  negotiation  process  is 
proving  to  be  highly  controversial  and  difficult 
because of the reticence shown by a majority of 
member  states’  governments  and  the  concerns 
expressed  by  the  private  sector  as  regards  the 
implications  of  a  stronger  European  regulatory 
framework  on  data  protection  for  their 
businesses.18 On the other hand, the negotiations 
                                                   
15 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:181:0034:0042:EN:PDF 
16 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:PDF  
17  http://www.ceps.be/book/towards-new-eu-legal-
framework-data-protection-and-privacy-challenges-
principles-and-role-europ  
18 The original proposal by the European Commission did 
contain an express provision (Article 42) that would have 6 | BIGO, BOULET, BOWDEN, CARRERA, GUILD, HERNANZ, DE HERT, JEANDESBOZ & SCHERRER 
 
as regards the proposal for the Directive are being 
particularly contested, as this is a field where EU 
national  governments  remain  hesitant  to  lose 
discretion in favour of European institutions. To 
this  we  may  add  the  proposal  for  an  EU-US 
general agreement on the protection of personal 
data  when  transferred  and  processed  for  the 
purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or 
prosecuting  criminal  offences,  including 
terrorism. No progress has been so far achieved 
because  of  fundamental  disagreements  between 
the  parties  involved  regarding  ‘common 
standards’.  
The  Data  Protection  package  does  not  seem  to 
address the fundamental lacuna in EU law and 
policy  regarding  private  sector  and  law 
enforcement  cooperation.  The  scope  of  this 
cooperation  should  not  be  underestimated. 
According  to  statistics  recently  published  by 
Reuters,  the  UK,  France  and  Germany  were  in 
2012  the  top  three  countries  behind  the  United 
States  to  request  user  data  from  Google, 
Microsoft, Skype and Twitter.19 These figures are 
piecemeal,  but  they  do  suggest,  alongside 
controversies over the involvement of the GHCQ 
in  the  UK,  that  the  issues  raised  by  the PRISM 
affair  are  not  limited  to  the  actions  of  the  US 
government.  
The  EU  does  not  have  common  standards 
applying  to  the  cooperation  between  IT 
companies and law enforcement in the EU, which 
comes as a surprise when taking into account the 
fast  pace  at  which  European  cooperation  in 
policing has evolved since 1992. This creates legal 
uncertainty between the actors involved, which is 
not beneficial to any of them. The lack of clearly 
defined rules and standards of cooperation and 
relations in the EU leads to mistrust and a lack of 
clarity as regards the possibility for companies to 
allow access by national governments requesting 
information. It also safeguards their interest not 
to face liability for the potential violation of EU 
data  protection  rights  and  principles. 
                                                                                      
made  the  processing  of  information  to  third  countries 
conditional  on  the  use  of  a  mutual  legal  assistance 
agreement  and  the  authorisation  by  a  competent  data 
protection  authority.  After  strong  lobbying  by  the  US 
government, however, the article disappeared and only a 
recital  in  the  Preamble  has  so  far  remained  covering 
transfers of data to third countries. 
19 http://reuters.tumblr.com/post/52817521108  
Governments  are  not  under  a  clear  legal 
obligation to inform companies when they have 
informal access to this data. 
An additional challenge relates to the necessity 
and  proportionality  tests  of  the  PRISM 
programme.  Is  the  programme  necessary  in  a 
democratic society? Obama’s reaction to the leaks 
of  secret  documents  was  to  defend  the  US 
government’s  collection  of  data  on  the  phone 
records of millions of Americans, declaring that 
in his view this was a “modest encroachment on 
the privacy” and one he thinks is both lawful and 
justified in order to identify terrorists plotting to 
attack the United States. Obama also called for an 
open discussion about “the balance between the 
need to keep the American people safe and our 
concerns  about  privacy”.  In  determining  the 
proportionality and the necessity in a democratic 
society  of  these  mass  surveillance  measures 
directed  at  EU  citizens  and  residents,  the 
following questions can be raised: Can we really 
talk  about  a  ‘balance’  in  light  of  the  rather 
disproportionate and mass-surveillance nature of 
the ‘fishing practices’ and the mass surveillance 
inherent  in  the  PRISM  programme?  Is  there 
oversight of the ‘fishing expeditions’ operated by 
the US intelligence services? Are these activities 
within the scope of the conferred powers and do 
they  respect  the  fundamental  principle  of 
purpose limitation? Finally, is massive electronic 
surveillance  the  most  efficient  and  least-
restrictive policy option for law enforcement? 
These  questions  should  be  familiar  to  EU  and 
member  State  authorities,  and  are  a  matter  of 
concern  for  EU  citizens  and  residents.  Blanket 
collection  and  retention  of  personal  data  are 
hardly  specific  to  US  policy  orientations  and 
have  been  repeatedly  called  into  question  by 
European  courts.  In  March  2010,  the  German 
Constitutional  Court  abrogated  the  German 
national  law  implementing  the  so-called  data 
retention  Directive  on  grounds  that  it  did  not 
meet  the  criteria  of  proportionality  for  data 
security,  purpose  limitation,  transparency, 
judicial  control  and  effective  legal  remedies.20 
Meanwhile,  notions  such  as  intelligence-led 
policing,  ‘data-sharing  by  default’  or  the 
principle of availability endorsed in various EU 
                                                   
20  K.  De  Vries  et  al.,  Proportionality  overrides  unlimited 
surveillance: The German Constitutional Court judgment on 
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strategy  and  policy  documents  foresaw  mass 
collection  and  retention  of  personal  data  in  the 
developing European model of law-enforcement 
cooperation.  The  challenge,  here,  lies  in  the 
possibility to reconsider these policy orientations 
in the light of new developments and to assess 
the actual need for and proportionality for such 
schemes. 
A final, yet still central policy challenge is that of 
‘cloud  computing’.  Two  points  in  particular 
warrant consideration, as discussed below.  
On the one hand, cloud computing involves the 
processing of information and data in remotely 
located computers and/or data centres accessed 
through the Internet. In itself, this notion defies 
traditional  European  privacy  guarantees  and 
safeguards  in  the  framework  of  international 
transfer  of  data  and  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement  authorities  and  private  sectors.  As 
argued in the previously cited study conducted 
for the European Parliament (Bigo et al., op. cit.), 
cloud  computing  challenges  the  40-year  old 
model applicable to international data transfers, 
i.e. the safe harbour principle. This principle allows 
data  transfers  to  US  organisations  that 
demonstrate an adequate standard of protection. 
In  the  case  of  cloud  computing,  however,  data 
subjects  who  are  clients  of  IT  companies  are 
caught in a complex matrix of contracts where the 
determination  of  legal  responsibilities, 
application of adequate standards and potential 
liabilities in cases of data protection violations are 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  ascertain  in 
practice.21  
The second point, on which the PRISM affair has 
shed  a  particularly  bright  light,  is  that  cloud 
computing  is  not  only  an  issue  of  remote  data 
storage,  but  also  of  remote  computing.  Cloud 
providers  spent  a  considerable  amount  of 
resources  in money,  energy  and CPU  cycles  on 
formatting,  indexing  and  otherwise  organising 
the data of their customers. In the case of PRISM, 
these resources have been harnessed to provide 
the NSA with the information it required. What 
                                                   
21 For a study of the political and legal challenges of cloud 
computing in the fight against crime refer to D. Bigo, G. 
Boulet,  C.  Bowden,  S.  Carrera,  J.  Jeandesboz  and  A. 
Scherrer  (2012),  Fighting  Cybercrime  and  Protecting 
Privacy  in  the  Cloud,  European  Parliament,  Brussels 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studie
sdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=79050  
seems to be happening, in this regard, is a variant 
of  Platform-as-a-Service  (PaaS),  where  a 
governmental  agency  delegates  the  task  of 
scalable  mass  surveillance  to  cloud  providers 
themselves. 
4.  What should the EU do? Policy 
Recommendations 
1.  Strengthen  the  legal  framework  for  data 
protection  in  the  EU.  All  the  relevant 
European institutions should work harder in 
the  smooth  development  of  a  more 
comprehensive  and  stronger  EU  legal 
framework and common standards applying 
to first, international transfers and processing 
of  data  and  second,  cooperation  between 
private  sector  (especially  IT  companies  and 
online  service  providers)  and  law 
enforcement  authorities  in  Europe.  The 
PRISM  affair  might  well  provide  the 
necessary political momentum and boost for 
speeding up the ongoing negotiations on the 
Commission’s  data  protection  legislative 
package,  including  not  only  the  Regulation 
but  also  the  Directive.  Both  legislative 
instruments  should  incorporate  express 
provisions  covering  international  transfers 
and  private-sector  law  enforcement 
cooperation  and  aim  at  the  strongest  data 
protection standards.  
The  general  data  protection  Regulation 
should  include  a  provision  stipulating  the 
legal  requirements  applicable  where  a 
judgment  of  a  court  or  tribunal  (or  any 
decision by an administrative authority) from 
a  third  country  requires  a  data 
controller/processor  to  transfer  personal 
data  of  EU  citizens  and  residents.  These 
should be only recognised and enforceable if 
there  exist  a  mutual  assistance  treaty  or 
international agreement in force between the 
requesting country and the EU, and after the 
verification  by  relevant  EU  data  protection 
authorities.22   
Special attention should be particularly paid 
to  better  ensuring  proper  guarantees  and 
                                                   
22  As  stipulated  in  Amendment  259,  Article  43a  of 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubR
ef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
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effective  remedies  in  hands  of  individuals 
(effective and enforceable rights) whose data 
protection  and  privacy  might  have  been 
violated  in  these  contexts.  Social  networks 
constitute  a  particularly  challenging  case  in 
point  from  the  perspective  of  privacy  and 
data  protection.  Users  of  'social  networks' 
should  be  offered  a  'right  to  be  informed' 
when  their  data  are  transferred  to  third 
countries.  This  could  consist  for  instance  of 
including  standardised  logos  or  pop-up 
icons/box (presenting multi-layered formats) 
informing  the  user  that  her/his  data  have 
been transferred/processed to a third country 
by using a clear, plain and adapted language, 
allowing  them  the  possibility  to  object  or 
consent.  The  general  data  protection 
Regulation proposal should reincorporate this 
obligation as originally proposed by the Draft 
Report  of  the  European  Parliament.23 
Moreover,  the  situation  of  third-country 
nationals  residing  in  the  EU,  who  are  also 
subject  to  increasing  processing  of  personal 
data in the EU, should constitute also a central 
focus point. A key issue here is the ways in 
which  this  EU  framework  of  protection  is 
being implemented (or not) in practice. 
The  nationality  or  country  of  residency 
should not be a constitutive factor here for the 
individual to have access, rectify or challenge 
her/his  data.  Non  US-citizens  or  residents 
should be allowed effective judicial remedies. 
The  Commission  should  make sure  that  EU 
data  protection  standards,  and  the 
negotiations in the current EU data protection 
package, are not undermined as result of the 
                                                   
23  See  Amendment  118  of  Article  11  of  the  proposal, 
which  has  now  surprisingly  disappeared  during  the 
negotiations 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub
Ref=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
501.927+04+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN).  See 
also the Opinion of Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, 15/2011, on the definition of consent, 13 July 2011, 
which also includes this idea to be offered to the user of 
social networks to select the use of data to which s/he 
agrees,  including  transfer  to  third  parties,  p.  18 
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp
docs/2011/wp187_en.pdf).  
Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) agreement with the US.24 
2.  Safeguard  the  rights  of  users  of  cloud 
computing.  An  accountability  approach 
(vesting of obligations and potential liabilities 
to  every  actor  with  power  or  knowledge 
about the access, use, transfer/processing of 
data) should be applied here. This should be 
accompanied by a concrete tool to ensure that 
individual  users  of  cloud  services  are 
properly  informed  of  the  risk  that  their 
private data might be used by US authorities 
without their consent. One approach could be 
to design a pop-up on Internet websites that 
would warn the user that her/his data might 
be  subject  to  surveillance  or  when  that 
information  leaves  the  EU.  Also,  the  safe 
harbour  principle  should  apply  to 
telecommunications  companies  and  carriers. 
The  Commission  should  review  its  recent 
Communication “Unleashing the Potential of 
Cloud  Computing  in  Europe”  (Brussels, 
27.9.2012 COM(2012) 529 final) in view of the 
recent revelations and consider, together with 
European  stakeholders,  alternatives  such  as 
the establishment of a ‘European Cloud’ and 
‘European  Facebook’.  Social  media  and  the 
Internet are today’s’ critical infrastructure and 
should receive proper protection accordingly. 
3.  Introduce a solid legal framework regulating 
third-country  data  transfer/processing. 
Strong  rules  applying  to  third-country  data 
transfers/processing  should  constitute 
another  central  component  deserving 
immediate  policy  and  legislative  attention. 
The use of existing legal channels should be 
favoured,  such  as  the  one  applicable  to 
mutual  legal  assistance.  This  should  be 
accompanied  by  an  injection  of  increased 
momentum in the negotiations on the EU-US 
agreement  on  data  protection  and  privacy, 
which  are  currently  frozen.  Here,  the  EU 
should  not  compromise  its  own  European 
privacy  standards  and  data  protection 
principles  in  favour  of  those  currently 
prevailing in the US. 
                                                   
24  See  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2013-
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4.  Implement  standard-setting  and  sharing  of 
experiences:  A  multi-actor  approach. 
Legislation  alone,  however,  would  not 
provide  an  all-encompassing  solution  to  the 
current  controversy  and  the  challenges 
pointed  out  in  this  Policy  Brief.  Legislation 
must be supplemented by the development of 
a  common  EU-level  set  of  standards  and 
guidelines applicable to practical cooperation 
between  companies,  law  enforcement 
agencies  and  the  judiciary.  A  multi-actor 
approach  should  be  the  one  preferred  and 
developed  as  should  also  a  bottom-up 
approach. This would consist of providing an 
EU  framework  for  sharing  experiences  and 
practical  challenges  experienced  by  law 
enforcement  authorities,  companies  and 
judicial authorities in the IT sector.  
5.  Put  in  place  a  policy  infrastructure  at  EU 
level capable of dealing with these kinds of 
revelations. There is a need for the European 
Parliament  to  reflect  critically  about  its 
capacity  to  deal  with  these  controversies. 
What  lessons  have  been  learned  from  the 
Echelon  event:  political  upheaval,  a 
Parliamentary  inquiry  and  then  very  little 
follow-up  and  impact.  A  more  systematic 
policy  follow-up  is  needed,  including  a 
protection  scheme  for  whistleblowers.  The 
European Parliament should open an enquiry 
into  the  whereabouts,  implications  and 
follow-up of the PRISM affair. This could be 
accompanied  by  an  inter-parliamentary 
delegation  to  the US  in  connection  with  the 
Transatlantic  Legislators  Dialogue  (TLD).  In 
this context, consideration should be given to 
setting up an inter-parliamentary commission 
between the European Parliament and the US 
Congress to debate ways forward to address 
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